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  
Abstract— After 38 years of birthday Diffie-Hellman Key 
Exchange (DHKE), there are many proposed improvements in 
the DHKE protocol to encounter modern security issues. This 
protocol seems quite simple to be implemented; but it can be 
vulnerable to many types of attacks. In this work, we propose 
the Chained Key Exchange scheme as a case study to explore 
cryptographic computation capability of embedded mi-
crocontroller. We choose ARM RaspberryPi board as 
hardware platform for experimental setup. To enable 
RasberberryPi “system on chip” (SoC) to perform 
cryptographic computation, we modified the GNU GMP 
Bignum library to support a simple primitive cryptographic 
computation in the UBOOT firmware. The main purpose of 
our study is to determine whether there is any gap between 
cryptographic protocol/scheme (in term of theoretical) and its 
engineering implementation. Our scheme will be integrated 
with Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) application in the 
UBOOT firmware. Our proposed scheme in the TFTP protocol 
will secure the sharing of secrets and symmetric keys (e.g., 
AES256).  After that, the symmetric encryption algorithm can 
be used to encrypt data in the cases of remote system updates, 
patching and upgrades (e.g., firmware, kernel or application). 
 
Index Terms— cryptography, key exchange protocol, 
DHKE, Diffie, Hellman, chain, smart device, lightweight, 
security, trust, privacy, kernel, Linux, Debian, RaspberryPi, 
UBOOT, TFTP, GMP, Bignum, ARM, SoC, firmware, 
precision number computation, symmetric, asymmetric, 
number theory. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he state of art for key exchange protocol is based on 
1976 paper “New Directions in Cryptography” [1], 
Diffie and Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) present a secure 
key agreement protocol that can be carried out over 
unsecure public communication channels. This protocol 
seems quite simple to be implemented; but it can be 
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vulnerable to many types of attacks that are based on 
Number Theory. In this work, we propose the Chained Key 
Exchange scheme as a case study to explore cryptographic 
computation capability of embedded microcontroller. 
II. RELATED WORK 
After 38 years of birthday DHKE, there are more than 50 
proposed improvements in DHKE protocol to encounter 
security issues such as: J.F. Raymond (2002) [2] collective 
of attacks in the DHKE protocol and a good idea about how 
to securely implement the DH protocol in various systems. 
E. Brickell (2004) [3] provided the first Direct Anonymous 
Attestation (DAA) scheme based on the strong RSA 
assumption and decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. 
R.C.W Phan (2006) [4] performs cryptanalysis in the DHKE 
using N-party encrypted different passwords.  
E.J. Yoon (2009) [5] proposed an efficient DH’s MAC 
with forward secrecy, key independence and protection 
against session state reveal attacks. D. Fiore (2010) [6] 
proposed a new identity based key agreement protocol that 
is can be implemented over any cyclic group of prime order, 
where the Diffie-Hellman problem is supposed to be hard. P. 
Vyas (2012) [7] described various protocols used for key 
exchange such as freshness of message. H. K. Pathak (2013) 
[11] proposed two password based of simple three party key 
exchange protocols via twin Diffie-Hellman problem and 
showed the proposed protocols provide greater security and 
efficiency than the existing protocols. 
III. MOTIVATION 
Our main motivation in proposing the Chain Key 
Exchange scheme is to explore the computation capability 
of embedded microcontrollers such as ARM6 RaspberryPi 
board in performing cryptographic computation. To explore 
the possible constraints in the theoretical and experimental 
designs, we have decided to only use the RaspberryPi board 
and a USB debug/console cable as experimental setup for 
the experiment. The RaspberryPi board can support extra 
I/O functions (add-on card) including sensors, Wi-Fi, 
camera, sub controllers (e.g., random number generator and 
customized FPGA with cryptographic functions) and etc. 
However, we omitted these extra I/O features because we 
want to study a plain embedded board to perform 
cryptographic functions. 
Chained Key Exchange scheme can be considered as a 
simple key exchange protocol with only minimal security 
properties such as forward secrecy and key independence 
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 for implementation in the experiment.  The main purpose of 
our study is to determine whether there is any gap between 
cryptographic protocol/scheme (in term of theoretical) and 
its engineering implementation. Our intention is to make it 
as a full working generic security device from an existing 
microcontroller. From our past experience, we know that is 
not trivial to do implementation of a cryptographic device 
which is secured in theoretical, and also secure in its 
realized device. 
A. Objective 
The objective of this paper is to explore cryptographic 
computation capability of Chained Key Exchange scheme 
for an embedded microcontroller in a constrained 
environment. 
B. Target Application 
This study will attempt to establish a secure and trust 
based key exchange protocol in the embedded controller. 
The term of “trust” is based on our previous work in Trusted 
Computing wherein “How can we be assured device(s) and 
system(s) are trusted if we use trusted computing platform 
(e.g.,  TPM) as root of trust?” [8]. For this experiment, we 
do not use Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), but rather, we 
explore the concept of “chain of trust” in the cryptographic 
scheme, i.e. chain of trust of secret keys. The “chain of trust 
of secret keys” allows our protocol to verify that new 
communication with third parties is the same as previous 
communication through secure transitive sessions. The 
proposed protocol would be useful for lightweight or smart 
embedded device to identify whether an adversary is trying 
to intrude into the confidential communication. Energy 
usage becomes major factor for operational consideration by 
lightweight devices especially for deployment without 
compromising on security. In our proposal, we will use 
minimal I/O peripheral to reduce energy consumption, and 
at the same time yield high cryptographic computation in the 
autonomous environment. 
In the long term run, our scheme will provide an 
implementation of Secure Trivial File Transfer Protocol 
(TFTP) application in the UBOOT firmware. It will ensure 
remote system updates and patching (e.g., firmware, kernel 
or application) processes are secure from attacks which aim 
to eavesdrop and modify the TFTP packet. The target 
employment of Secure TFTP protocol is in the Wi-Fi Access 
Points, remote base stations, wireless sensor nodes and etc. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
A. Chained Key Exchange Scheme 
A1. Initialization of pre-shared knowledge between two 
parties (assume that their names are Along and Busu). This 
pre-shared knowledge must happen during production, 
physical exchange or through a trusted communication. 
 
Along generates: core root of trust (crt) of random numbers 
ܽ௖௥௧, ݌௖௥௧,	݃௖௥௧ 	 ∈ 	Ժ௡∗ . Along stores ܽ௖௥௧, ݌௖௥௧,	݃௖௥௧ in the 
non-volatile memory equipped with physical tamper-
resistant technology. Along’s secret ܽ௖௥௧ is protected using 
user authentication. Then, Along computes: 
ܣ௖௥௧	 ≡ 	݃௖௥௧௔೎ೝ೟ 	ሺmod	݌௖௥௧	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܣ௖௥௧	ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊ 
Along share public information ܣ௖௥௧	, ݌௖௥௧,	݃௖௥௧ with Busu.  
 
Busu generates: core root of trust (crt) of random numbers, 
length of n-bits ܾ௖௥௧ 	 ∈ 	Ժ௡∗ . Busu stores ܾ௖௥௧, ݌௖௥௧,	݃௖௥௧ in 
the non-volatile memory equipped with physical tamper-
resistant technology. Busu’s secret ܾ௖௥௧ is protected using 
user authentication. Then, Busu computes:   
ܤ௖௥௧	 ≡ 	݃௖௥௧௕೎ೝ೟	ሺmod	݌௖௥௧	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܤ௖௥௧	ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊ 
ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	 ≡ 	ܣ௖௥௧௕೎ೝ೟	ሺmod	݌௖௥௧	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊ 
Busu share public information ܤ௖௥௧	 with Along.  
 
Along computes: 
ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	 ≡ 	ܤ௖௥௧௔೎ೝ೟	ሺmod	݌௖௥௧	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊ 
Finally, both parties store the matching secret ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	in the 
non-volatile memory with physical tamper resistant 
technology wherein the secret key is protected using user 
authentication. This initialization of crt key is less likely to 
be computed compared to the session key and chain key. We 
assumed ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	computation happens only in safe 
environments (e.g., during production of embedded device) 
and no integrity verification of the messages is required. 
Furthermore, an adversary would not be able to eavesdrop 
this information because it happens in close environments. 
This initialization scheme has been originated from DHKE 
[1] scheme.  
 
A2. Initialization of “chained of session key” between two 
parties. 
In this scenario, the “chain of session key” occurs in open 
communication channel; hence it is still vulnerable to 
adversaries.  
Along generates: chain of session of random numbers.  
ܽ௜, ݌௜,	݃௜ 	 ∈ Ժ௡∗   and i = 0, where 0 is initial chain sequence and 
ܽ௜ 	് 		ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	,  ݌௜ 	് 		 ݌௖௥௧		,  ݃௜ ് 		 ݃௖௥௧		 
Along stores ܽ௜, ݌௜,	 ௜݃ in the non-volatile memory equipped 
with physical tamper-resistant technology. Along’s secret 
ܽ௖௥௧ is protected using user session authentication. Then, 
Along computes:   
ܣ௜	 ≡ 	݃௜௔೔	ሺmod	݌௜	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܣ௜		ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊ 
Along share public information ܣ௜	, ݌௜,	 ௜݃ with Busu.  
 
 
Busu generates: secret ܾ௜	of random numbers, of length n-
bits. 
ܾ௜ 	 ∈ Ժ௡∗ 		and	i	 ൌ 	0, where 0 is initial chain sequence 
Busu stores ܾ௜, ݌௜,	 ௜݃ in the non-volatile memory equipped 
with physical tamper-resistant. Busu’s secret ܽ௜ is protected 
using user session authentication. Then, Busu computes:   
ܤ௜	 ≡ 	݃௜௕೔	ሺmod	݌௜	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܤ௜	ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊ 
ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ≡ 	ܣ௜௕೔	݃௜௄௘௬೎ೝ೟	ሺmod	݌௜	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܭ݁ݕ௜	ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊          (1) 
Busu share public information ܤ௜	with Along. 
 
Along computes: 
ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ≡ 	ܤ௜௔೔	݃௜௄௘௬೎ೝ೟	ሺmod	݌௜	ሻ					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁		ܭ݁ݕ௜	ݏ݅ݖ݁	݋݂	݊          (2) 
Session ܭ݁ݕ௜ୀ଴	needs to be verified before being stored or 
used (explained in Section A3 for details). The shared secret 
ܭ݁ݕ௜	 requires 3n length of exponential computation or ܱሺ3݊ሻ	 as shown in (3). For the next session of key 
computation, we use key derivative function to derive 
ܭ݁ݕ௜ୀ଴	 from ܭ݁ݕ௜ୀ଴	. Therefore, we conclude that the ܭ݁ݕ௜ୀଵ	as follow: 
ܭ݁ݕଵ	 ≡ 	݃ଵ௔భ	 . ݃ଵ௕భ	. ݃ଵ௄௘௬బ	 	ሺ݉݋݀	݌ଵ	ሻ                                      (3) 
However, there is no guarantee that ܭ݁ݕ௜	in (1-3) will be the 
size of n after the successful key exchange process. In worst 
case scenario, it produces a weak key with a short length. 
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 Therefore, ܭ݁ݕ௜	 needs to be checked1/discarded before we 
can proceed to the verification process as it will be 
explained next.  
 
A3. Verification of “chained of session key” 
The purpose of verification is to ensure that both parties 
will synchronize and Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
the generated ܭ݁ݕ௜	from Section A2. If successful, both 
parties will store the matching secret ܭ݁ݕ௜	in the non-
volatile memory equipped with physical tamper resistant 
technology wherein the secret key is protected using user 
authentication. The previous ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	 (if it still exists) is 
safely wiped out from nonvolatile memory. We define 
nonce as ݊݋݊ܿ݁௜ 	 ∈ ሺԺ௡∗ ሻ	and	initial	with	݊݋݊ܿ݁௜ୀ଴ ൌ	0′s	string		of	length	n. 
 
Along performs hashing function: 
݂݅	݅ ൌ 0;		݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஺௟௢௡௚೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄ሺܭ݁ݕ௜	 ∥ 	ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	 ∥ 	 ݊݋݊ܿ݁௜	ሻ		݈݁ݏ݁		  
݂݅	݅ ൐ 0;	݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஺௟௢௡௚೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄ሺܭ݁ݕ௜	 ∥ 	ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	 ∥ 	 ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ௜ିଵ 	 ∥ 	 ݊݋݊ܿ݁௜	ሻ 
 
Along expects ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஻௨௦௨೔ ݂݅	݅ ൌ 0;		݀݅݃݁ݏݐா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	஻௨௦௨೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄ሺܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	 ∥ 	ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ∥ 	 ݊݋݊ܿ݁௜	ሻ		݈݁ݏ݁ 
݂݅	݅ ൐ 0; 	݀݅݃݁ݏݐா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	஻௨௦௨೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄൫	ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	 ∥ 	ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ∥ 	 ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ௜ିଵ 	 ∥	݊݋݊ܿ݁݅	  
Along shares public information ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஺௟௢௡௚೔ with Busu. 
 
Busu performs hashing function: 
	݂݅	݅ ൌ 0; 	݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஻௨௦௨೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄ሺܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	 ∥ 	ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ∥ 	 ݊݋݊ܿ݁௜	ሻ	݈݁ݏ݁ 
݂݅	݅ ൐ 0; 	݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஻௨௦௨೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄	ሺ	ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	 ∥ 	ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ∥ 	 ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ௜ିଵ 	 ∥ 	 ݊݋݊ܿ݁௜	ሻ 
 
Busu expects ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஺௟௢௡௚೔: ݂݅	݅ ൌ 0; 			݀݅݃݁ݏݐா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	஺௟௢௡௚೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄ሺܭ݁ݕ௜	 ∥ 	ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	 ∥ 	 ݊݋݊ܿ݁௜	ሻ		݈݁ݏ݁ 
 ݂݅	݅ ൐ 0; 	݀݅݃݁ݏݐா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	஺௟௢௡௚೔ ൌ ݄ܽݏ݄ሺܭ݁ݕ௜ ∥ 		ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	 ∥ 	 ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ௜ିଵ 	 ∥	݊݋݊ܿ݁௜	ሻ 
Busu shares public information ݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஻௨௦௨೔ with Along. 
Along verifies: 
 ݀݅݃݁ݏݐா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	஻௨௦௨೔ ൌ 	݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஻௨௦௨೔  
 
Busu verifies: 
 ݀݅݃݁ݏݐா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	஺௟௢௡௚೔ ൌ 	݀݅݃݁ݏݐ஺௟௢௡௚೔ 
 
 Observe that in hashing function between Along and 
Busu, the sequence of hashing function is different in the 
first parameter and the second parameter for the hashing 
input. This will guarantee that the hashing digests of Along 
and Busu are different for the MAC authentication process. 
To protect from an attack based on Number Theory, such as 
“degenerate message attack” [2], we need to ensure random 
secrets, public parameters and ܭ݁ݕ௜	 are not recycled 
numbers. For the next session, we must use a secure one 
way key derivation function to derive ܭ݁ݕ௜	 from ܭ݁ݕ௜	to 
avoid using previous key. 
After that, both parties store ܭ݁ݕ௜	 that has been 
successfully verified. In case of failure, the digest need to be 
retransmitted (retry) because errors may happen in 
communication medium when using non-reliable network. 
Failure to do correction and verification within the allowed 
number of retries, the verification process is considered 
 
1 We can use generated key with a key length less than n (e.g. 
ሺ݊	– 	2ሻ	length); but we need to use a secure one way key 
expander/derivation function to fill-up (or padding) the less significant part 
of number in ሺ݊	– 	2ሻ length. However this is very risky when the 
ሺ݊	– ቀ௡ଶቁ	ሻ	length is too short.  
invalid and the chain of session ݅ must be dropped. All 
temporary data in Section A2 must also be safely wiped out 
from volatile memory. If this problem happens, we can 
consider that there are problems i) in the communication 
channel, ii) an active adversary is impersonating either 
parties or iii) an active adversary has tampered the digest. 
B. Embedded System 
We decided to use RasberberryPi Model B (Fig. 1) with 
specifications: BCM2835 (ARMv6k) 700 MHz, 512MB 
RAM, 16GB SD memory card, 10/100 Ethernet port. This 
board is widely used for system prototyping or experiment, 
system controller, surveillance system, cluster nodes, 
embedded programming etc. We have done literature review 
on past works and we found that it is not well explored yet. 
From here, we decided to conduct cryptographic primitive 
computation using this board. Among the major issues need 
to be considered when using this board are GCC ARM 
compiler and GMP Bignum [9] library to compute numbers 
beyond 32-bit integers (e.g., exponential, modular, etc.). 
We conducted an experiment based on “one-group 
pretest-posttest” [10][11] experimental design to evaluate 
performance measurement of Chained Key Exchange 
scheme. The first test group was conducted in application 
layer (user space) through Linux Raspbian “wheezy” Kernel 
using precompiled image “2013-07-26-wheezy-
raspbian.zip” [12]. The second test group was conducted in 
firmware layer (bare metal) using Denx U-Boot [13] as 
platform for bare metal execution of our scheme. U-Boot 
provides cross platform execution because it supports 
multiple embedded architecture such as ARM, MIPS, PPC, 
x86, 68k, Nios and etc. Therefore, we are confident that 
with a very minimal configuration, our protocol can be 
deployed in multiple embedded systems. 
To enable RasberberryPi “system on chip” (SoC) to 
perform cryptographic computation, we modified the GMP 
Bignum version gmp-5.1.0 [9] library for a simple primitive 
cryptographic library. However, major modification is 
required in a bare metal system because of missing C library 
and its dependencies in the U-Boot. We noted that most of 
standard C libraries are meant for application and kernel 
layers, but not in firmware layer. This means that most of C 
libraries in firmware programming are minimal for the 
purpose of startup for the device and loading an operating 
system kernel for a system to boot up. To reduce the 
complexity, we modified the “mini-gmp” section to 
diminish the dependency problems. The modified “mini-
gmp” is encoded in the first and second group experiments 
for fairness of execution and timing measurements. Our new 
“mini-gmp” library support the major functions for 
cryptographic computations such as mpz_init(), 
mpz_clear(), mpz_t, mpz_set_str(), mpz_powm(), 
mpz_get_str(), mpz_cmp(),  mpz_sub(), mpz_add(), 
mpz_ui_pow_ui(), mpz_gcdext(), mpz_invert() clock(), 
SHA512(), and etc. Based on our previous work, we work 
on the communication protocol for two sets of 
RasberberryPi board using a secure TFTP protocol for smart 
environment [14]. This work [14] we discussed the 
modification of U-Boot’s TFTP protocol to support a secure 
key exchange and data encryption. 
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Fig. 1.  Experimental Testbed. 
 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. Protocol Security 
The underlying security principles for Chain Key 
Exchange scheme are based on the i) Decision Diffie-
Hellman Problem (DDHP) [15] and ii) one way hash 
function [16]. To solve DDLP, an adversary needs to find 
ܽ௜, ܾ௜, ܽ௖௥௧, ܾ௖௥௧ in Section A1. For example, 	݃௜		is a 
primitive root of ݌௜ of order ݊. 
ܭ݁ݕଵ	 ≡ 	 ௜݃௔೔	 . ௜݃௕೔ 	. ௜݃௄௘௬೔	 	ሺ݉݋݀	݌ଵ	ሻ		݂݅	݊ ൐ 	2଼଴ 
It is not feasible to use brute force to find ܭ݁ݕଵ	 in above 
equation. The fast algorithm to do brute force for modular 
exponential requires time complexity of ܱሺ2௡ሻ where ݊ is a 
number of steps in bits. We use hash function in Section A3 
for verification of secret key that is generated during chain 
of key exchange. We consider a simple Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) hash function to verify Along’s 
and Busu’s shared secret key in the communication. We also 
assume that the one way hash function is a secure pseudo 
random generator [16] wherein the adversary cannot 
distinguish the hashing output (digest) from input to the 
hashing algorithm. For the moment, we use a standard 
SHA512 because it has been assumed to be secure2 based on 
many recent literature [17][18][19][20][21]. Based on these 
two underlying security assumptions stated above, we 
consider our protocol as secure against the following 
outsider attacks: 
i. Session state reveal attack: The Chain Key Exchange 
scheme is secure even when an adversary manages to 
know the current session secrets ܽ௜, ܾ௜ in Sections A1 
and A2 above. An adversary cannot compute  
ܭ݁ݕ଴	 ≡ ݃଴௔బ	.		௕బ		.		ࡷࢋ࢟ࢉ࢚࢘	ሺ݉݋݀	݌଴ሻ			 or  ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ≡
௜݃௔೔	.		௕೔		.		ࡷࢋ࢟࢏ష૚	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜ሻ because root key ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	 
and chain key 		ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	 are unknown.  
ii. Forward secrecy: The Chain Key Exchange scheme is 
still secure even when an adversary manages to know 
the previous session secrets 
ܽ௜ିଵ, ܾ௜ିଵ, ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	, ܭ݁ݕ௖௥௧	in Sections A1. An 
adversary cannot compute  
ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ≡ ௜݃ࢇ࢏	.		࢈࢏		.		௄௘௬೎ೝ೟	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜ሻ			 or  ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ≡
௜݃ࢇ࢏	.		࢈࢏		.			ࡷࢋ࢟࢏ష૚	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜ሻ because current session 
secrets ܽ௜, ܾ௜ are unknown. 
 
2 We choose to use SHA-512 because it receives wider input block in 
size of 1024 bits and output hashing digest in size of 64 words or strings. 
With this size of input block, it can be pushed all at once for n = 1024 bits. 
It helps to produce a better MAC in terms of 64 words of hashing digest. 
iii. Key independence: Based on the forward secrecy, the 
scheme is secure when an adversary manages to 
know the previous secret key ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	because of a 
new session secrets ܽ௜, ܾ௜, ܭ݁ݕ௜	 are generated and 
computed independently from all previous sessions. 
An adversary cannot attack a new chain of session 
using previous knowledge; even if those previous 
session keys are already broken and exposed. This 
requires the total length of all secrets (ܽ௜, ܾ௜,
ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	ሻ ൐ 3݊ length of bits and each secret ൒ ݊ 
length of bits. At present, it is acceptable to use 2௡ 
where ݊ ൌ 1024 bits length. Based on DDHP 
assumption, an adversary knowledge of ܭ݁ݕ௜ିଵ	 is 
considered infeasible to derive 
ܭ݁ݕ௜	 ≡ ௜݃௔೔	.		௕೔		.		௄௘௬೔షభ	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜ሻ because of 
unknown secrets ܽ௜, ܾ௜ (total 2௡ of secrets length is 
considered infeasible to attack). Therefore, using new 
ephemeral random numbers ܽ௜, ܾ௜ with appropriate 
length, our scheme is resistant against “Denning-
Sacco” [22] [7] attack.  
iv. Key derivation function attack: Our scheme can resist 
the Burmester triangle attack [23] because we include 
1) key derivate function to derive ܭ݁ݕ௜	 from 
ܭ݁ݕ௜	and 2) the public parameters  ܣ௜	and ܤ௜	only 
consist 2n length of exponential computations of 2 
secrets (such as ܽ௜, ܾ௜) in Section A2. Both public 
parameters could never be computed with ௜݃ 	௄௘௬೎ೝ೟	 or  
௜݃ 	௄௘௬೔షభ	 (due to the missing the 3rd secret value in 
public parameters as). An adversary can impersonate 
Along when communicated with Busu in (4-6) and 
vice versa (7-9). Let us assume that an adversary can 
also manages to break previous session ݅ െ 1 with 
adversary’s knowledge of the secrets 
ܽ௜, ܾ௜	ܽ݊݀		ܭ݁ݕ௜	. However, the adversary will fail to 
break (11) of our protocol because of the two reasons 
mentioned above. With a strong key derivation 
function, we can secure future session keys because it 
destroys algebraic relationships3 in between old 
session keys and new session keys. 
ܣ௔ௗ௩	 ≡ 	݃௜௔ೌ೏ೡ	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ                                                  (4)
ܤ௕௨௦௨	 ≡ 	݃௜௕್ೠೞೠ	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ                                               (5)
ܭ݁ݕ௔ௗ௩ା௕௨௦௨	 ≡ 	݃௜௔ೌ೏ೡ		.		௕್ೠೞೠ	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ                          (6) 
ܣ௔௟௢௡௚	 ≡ 	݃௜௔ೌ೗೚೙೒	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ                                            (7)
ܤ௔ௗ௩	 ≡ 	݃௜௕ೌ೏ೡ	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ                                                  (8)
ܭ݁ݕ௔௟௢௡௚ା௔ௗ௩	 ≡ 	݃௜௕ೌ೏ೡ	.		௔ೌ೗೚೙೒	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ                        (9)
(6) and (9)   ܭ݁ݕ௔௟௢௡௚ା௔ௗ௩	+ ܭ݁ݕ௔ௗ௩ା௕௨௦௨	 
ܭ݁ݕ௔௟௢௡௚ା௕௨௦௨	 ≡	 
݃௜௔ೌ೏ೡ	.		௕್ೠೞೠ	 ൅ 	݃௜௕ೌ೏ೡ	.		௔ೌ೗೚೙೒	 ൅ ݃௜௄௘௬೔షభ	 	െ ሺ݃௜௔ೌ೏ೡ	 ൅
	݃௜௕ೌ೏ೡ	ሻሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ                                                            (10)
From (10)   
ܭ݁ݕ௔௟௢௡௚ା௕௨௦௨	 ≡ 	݃௜௔ೌ೗೚೙೒	.		௕್ೠೞೠ	.		௄௘௬೔షభ	 	ሺ݉݋݀	݌௜	ሻ      (11)
 
3 We considered that the key derivation function is a secure one way 
pseudo random function wherein both sides (Along and Busu) are using the 
same function to derive ܭ݁ݕ௜	 from ܭ݁ݕ௜	. 
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 Key agreement and confirmation: Authentication based on 
hashing MAC is used to protect message integrity, replay 
attack, man-in-the-middle attack and chain of session keys 
in Section A3. 
B. Hardware Security 
Physical access to RaspberryPi board is a major problem 
in the product deployment. An attacker can easily remove 
the SD card memory from the board and use memory card 
reader to access all data in the SD card. We can encrypt the 
memory region in SD card using common techniques such 
as disk encryption4. At the moment, there is no temper 
resistant circuit in the devices, it can be easily broken if an 
attacker has physical access to the device. We need extra I/O 
devices that are connected to board with implementation of 
physical temper resistant (e.g., memory), physically 
unclonable function (PUF), and etc. 
C. Security Checkpoints for Implementation 
We have listed below some security concerns and guidelines 
for the implementation and deployment. For additional 
reading, one may refer to [2] for further understanding of 
good security implementations. 
i. Weak primes group and order: Vulnerability to Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm, composite order subgroup for 
݌ ൌ 2ݍ ൅ 1, Pollard Lambda algorithm, Number Field 
Sieve algorithm and etc. 
ii. Weak randomness of number generator and randomness 
seeds.  
iii. Key management and memory segregation for many 
sessions for different applications. 
iv. Choosing k size of symmetric key encryption, we need 
2k size of exponential of each secrets to secure against 
Pollard's rho method (finding collisions between values 
computed in a large number space) 
v. Never recycle any keys after usage. 
vi. Generate a new session key for symmetric encryption 
before it reaches a point that is encrypted message or 
hashing MAC will produce collisions.  
vii. There is possibility that the proposed scheme is 
vulnerable to timing attacks because of exponential 
computation in RaspberryPi. If an adversary can 
effectively and precisely determine the computation of 
700 MHz CPU to compute public parameters from 
Along’s or Busu’s secrets. However, an implementation 
of key derivate function in our scheme will render the 
timing issue. 
viii. Check data type of numbers (int, unsigned, sign, strings, 
byte stream and etc), valid values range or size of 
received in the I/O buffer before loading it into 
cryptographic functions.  
VI. RESULT & DISCUSSION 
Table I shows the result of experiments wherein each 
experiment sessions are measured in seconds. All 
experimental setup are using the same codes and input data 
such as primes number, ephemeral secrets and etc. We use 
pre-generated random numbers and other input data to 
guarantee that is each experimental setup are free from bias 
 
4 The size of UBOOT firmware with implementation of our scheme is 
185,584 bytes. We can add user authentication module in the UBOOT 
firmware when user want to access our scheme (encrypted memory regions 
of secrets and keys). We considered it as a future work. 
of randomness when using random number generator. The 
most fascinating and unexpected finding is that the 
performance of the protocol in bare metal is slower than 
execution in the operating system5. The results shown the 
computation time to exchange one secret key based on 
Sections A2, A3 and network performance. We omitted the 
Section A1 because of it can be generated using original 
DHKE or pre-install the device with core-root-key during 
manufacturing process. Based on result in the Table 1, it is 
required 12~14 computation times to exchange a secret key 
in length of 2048 bits to compare with 1024 bits secret key. 
We conclude that is our experiment meets the minimal 
target objective in the research and development of Secure 
TFTP application in the UBOOT. It is extremely difficult 
and unrealistic to make a 360 degrees security fortification 
in order to fulfill all security requirements such as side-
channel security and [2] because of resource limitation in 
the embedded devices.  
 
TABLE I 
An Average of Chain of Key Exchange Scheme (One Chain Cycle) 
Performance in Second. 
No Experimental Setup 
࢔=1024 
Bits Key 
࢔=2048  
Bits Key 
1 
RaspberryPi, Bare Metal, default 
UBOOT setting (disable CPU’s internal 
caches), modified GMP Bignum library. 
8.364 63.998 
2 
RaspberryPi, Bare Metal, modified 
UBOOT codes & setting (enable CPU’s 
internal caches), modified GMP Bignum 
library. 
1.887 14.671 
3 
RaspberryPi, console, 2013-07-26-
wheezy-raspbian OS image, modified 
GMP Bignum library. 
1.571 12.035 
4 
RaspberryPi, GUI console (startx), 
2013-07-26-wheezy-raspbian OS image, 
modified GMP Bignum library. 
1.607 12.093 
5 
HP Elitebook 8440w, 2.8 GHz i7, 8 GB 
RAM, Debian 6 OS and GUI (startx). 
0.196 1.479 
 
VII. SUGGESTIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Varied research and developments works must be done to 
improve the proposed scheme. For the security protocol, we 
plan to investigate the usage of Diophantine Equation Hard 
Problem (DEHP) [24] [25] to provide faster cryptographic 
computation to replace the DDHP because of it is slower in 
the exponential computation.  We want to include a zero 
energy consumption of true random number generator using 
a wide band passive antenna and frequency hopping in 
receiver (Rx) antenna. This wide band receiver will 
consume analog signals or frequencies in the air space as 
input for powerless random number generator (or green 
RNG). For a current work, our research group is focusing in 
developing a secure TFTP communication in radio 
frequency (RF) using CISECO B023 Slice of Radio RF 
 
5 Before we conduct the bare metal experiment, we used to believed that 
execution in the bare metal is faster because it is free from any disturbance 
of operating system [27] scheduling or context switching of processes (our 
hypothesis). Result of Table 1, prove that we need to consider the hardware 
implementation to make it works faster. In the bare metal environment; 
there is no pipelining and other OS’s caching techniques that helps to 
improve the performance of data fetching and CPU’s instruction fetching 
for CPU’s execution process. 
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 transceiver [26]. For the cryptographic computing, we want 
to proof our hypothesis that executing in the bare metal is 
faster than executes in the generic operating system. This 
required additional programming in the UBOOT to improve 
CPU’s caches and external caches, DMA and pipelining 
processes in the MMU. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We presented our Chain of Key Exchange scheme with 
experimental results. We succeed to fulfill our research 
objective and that is to explore cryptographic computation 
capability of embedded microcontroller in the constrained 
environment. Our major contribution is the integration of 
our scheme for secure TFTP application in the UBOOT 
firmware. However, the result in the experiments is not 
pretty as our hypothesis expectation. The result shown that 
is the performance of our scheme in the bare metal is slower 
compared to execution in the operating system. At the 
moment, we considered this is the most flopped research 
hypothesis for this research project. One might think that is 
our scheme and experiment are failure work. But, we will 
keep trying with new ideas and improve it even that are our 
100th flopped ideas and God rewards fool6.  
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